Skip to content

Nicholas Crafts

British economic historian (b. 1949), CBE, professor emeritus at the University of Sussex (previously Warwick, LSE). Trained at Cambridge and Oxford. The single most influential figure in modern quantitative reconstruction of British long-run economic growth, and through that work the principal architect of the gradualist revision of the Industrial Revolution.

Crafts’s career has been an unusually disciplined cliometric program. The signature move is to build sectoral output reconstructions for British agriculture, industry, and services from the available archival evidence, combine them via a transparent national-accounting framework, and let the resulting aggregate per-capita-GDP series talk back to whatever rhetorical framing of the IR was current. The 1985 book British Economic Growth During the Industrial Revolution was the first comprehensive application; the 1992 Crafts–Harley restatement (with C. Knick Harley) defended and consolidated the revised numbers against critics. Subsequent work has refined the series, extended growth-accounting decompositions back to 1700 and forward through the 20th century, and addressed productivity puzzles (the Solow residual, the British vs. American post-1870 gap, the post-1973 productivity slowdown).

The substantive finding that defines Crafts’s reputation: aggregate British per-capita GDP grew at perhaps 0.3–0.5% per year through the 1760s–1820s and only accelerated to ~1% per year after ~1830. This is much slower than the Rostow “take-off” image (which had the IR as a sharp 1783–1802 discontinuity), substantially below the Deane–Cole estimates that preceded it, and just modest enough to make the very word “revolution” feel rhetorically overloaded. Crafts himself does not deny that the IR was transformative — the composition of the economy changed dramatically, the modern growth trajectory emerged from this period, and the long-run welfare consequences are enormous — but the quantitative discontinuity is not in the data.

The Crafts framework has been the field’s default since the late 1980s. Almost every contemporary IR account works within or against the Crafts numbers; nobody seriously defends the older Deane–Cole or Rostow figures anymore. The principal substantive critique has been the Berg–Hudson Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution line: aggregate measures hide the qualitative-structural transformations (cotton sector growing at 6–7% per year; the factory system; women’s and children’s labour reorganization; regional specialization) that actually constitute the IR. This is a substantive disagreement about the right metric, not about the Crafts numbers per se.

Subsequent quantitative work has refined rather than overturned Crafts: the Broadberry-led British Economic Growth 1270–1870 extends the reconstruction back five centuries with broadly compatible methodology, showing modest but persistent pre-IR growth (the IR is “terminal acceleration of a long trend,” not the origin of growth). Productivity-decomposition work has refined estimates of TFP vs. capital-deepening contributions to the post-1820 acceleration.

Crafts has also been a major figure in 20th-century British comparative growth (the productivity slowdown, the post-1973 puzzle, the British relative decline literature) and has worked across multiple decades on European convergence and divergence. His later books include Forging Ahead, Falling Behind and Fighting Back (2018), a synthetic account of British growth since 1870.

  • British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution (1985).
  • With C. Knick Harley: “Output Growth and the British Industrial Revolution: A Restatement of the Crafts–Harley View” (Economic History Review, 1992).
  • “Productivity Growth in the Industrial Revolution: A New Growth Accounting Perspective” (Journal of Economic History, 2004).
  • With Knick Harley and Stephen Broadberry: contributions to the Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain (2004; 2nd ed. 2014).
  • Forging Ahead, Falling Behind and Fighting Back: British Economic Growth from the Industrial Revolution to the Financial Crisis (2018).